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Although the entailment relations betveen a simple conditionaJ. 
and a biconditional are unproblematic in symbolic logic, they have 
occasioned a certain amount of controversy in regard to natural language. 
Geis and Zwicky (1971) suggested that conditionaJ. sentences in English 
had a logicaJ. form characterized by a quasilogical property which they 
tet'Illed an ' invited inference' . This putative property (called 
Conditional Perfection) meant that every sentence vith a logical 
structure of the form 'If X, then Y' in some sense suggested its 
converse, 'If not X, then not Y'. For example, a conditional such as 
(1) was said to 'invite the inference' of (2) without, of course,  
actually entailing (2).  
(l) If you mow the lawn, I'll give you five dollars. 
(2) If you don't mow the lawn , I won't give you five dollars. 
Lilje (1972) and Boer and Lycan (1973) rejected the idea of 
Conditional Perfection as a real property of English conditionals, and 
documented a number of persuasive counterexamples to the claim that 
it exists as a general property of all conditional utterances. 1 Never-
theless, I think that the original observation has some interest if it 
is viewed in pragmatic rather than semantic terms. In this paper, I 
vill try to show that there exists a systematic relationship between 
what type of speech act is being performed and whether the conditional 
embodying that speech act tends to situationally imply its converse. 
When condtionals are considered in relation to their function as 
speech acts, it becomes necessary to recognize t wo kinds of relation-
ships between antecedent clauses and their consequents. In the case 
of an assertion, the if-~ construction expresses a contingent 
relation between the truth value of two propositions. That is, the 
if- clause expresses a sufficient condition for the consequent to be 
~- Moreover, both clauses are members of a unitary act of 
asserting. Thus, if someone uttered (3) he could be said to have made 
a true and felicitous assertion even if it turns out that the proposition 
made in each subclause is false, since the contingent relation still 
holds and this is what has been asserted. 
(3) If it doesn't rain, our crops will be ruined. 
The point is that whether or not it rains, the act of uttering (3), 
and its consequences for speaker-addressee relations, will be unaffected. 
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However, when a conditional promise is being expressed, a rather 
different relation holds . When someone utters a sentence like (1), 
the if- clause expresses a condition on the act of nromising (expressed 
by the consequent). Moreover , the antecedent has an illocutionary 
force of its ovn, since in this case it is understood as a request . 2 
When the condition specified by the if-clause is not fulfilled the-	 ,
obligation invoked by the promise fails to take effect, or is nullified 
(depending on whether one considers that the act of promising is 
effective at the time of speaking or at the time of the fulfillment 
of the condition). This is true whether the antecedent conveys a 
request, as in (1), or an assertion of a state-of- the-world necessary 
for the promise to take effect, as in 
(4) If it rains, I'll take you home . 
Requests work in a parallel manner . If someone utters (5) or (6), 
he will not expect his addressee to be bound by the request until the 
condition in each case has been fulfilled. 
(5) If I mow the lawn, then give me five dollars . 
(6) If it rains, then take me home . 
Syntactically, then, we must recognize a difference between 
conditionals in which the antecedent functions as a sentential adverbial 
clause, and those in which it functions as a performative adverbial 
clause, qualifying the speech act performed by the consequent. This 
difference turns out to play a crucial role in explaining why people 
sometimes respond to conditionals as if they were biconditionals. 
When an assertion of a conditional sentence has been ma.de, it 
seems to me that any inference of the truth of its converse will depend 
upon the content and/or the context o f the utterance. For example , if 
someone utters 
(7) 	 If this cactus grovs native to Idaho, then it ' s not 
an Astrophytum. 
(example from Lilje 1972) it is very unlikely that be intends to imply 
its converse, 
(8) 	 If this cactus doesn't grow native to Idaho, then 
it's an Astropbytum,3 
Conunon know-ledge about botany makes it improbable that anyone would 
believe (8) on the strength of (7) . On the other hand, there seem to 
be many instances of the assertion of a conditional in contexts in which 
the converse is situationally implied. Consider 
(9) If John quits, be will be replaced. 
(example from Boer and Lycan (1973)), Someone who asserts (9), and 
is acting in good faith,~ will want to be as informative as possible 
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about the prospect of John's being replaced, and at the same time not 
say more than is necessary . By itself, (9) is not sufficiently 
informative unless the condition expressed is the crucial condition 
which is relevant to the present situation. It seems quite reasonable 
to believe that people do typically mention all factors relevant to 
a conditional assertion, and that they are expected to do so by their 
listeners. On the other hand, they are not expected to belabour an 
obvious 	fact, since this tends to imply that the addressee was too 
dull-witted to notice the obvious for himself. Thus it is easy to 
imagine a situation in which a sentence such as (10) would be literally 
true, but in which only (9) would be appropriate. 
(10) 	 If John quits, he will be replaced, but if he doesn't, 
he won't (at least in the relevant future and 
given no change in present circumstances) . 
(10) says too much that an addressee could have grasped for himself 
from bis knowledge of the situation. In other words, people often use 
simple conditionals in contexts in which the converse would also be 
true, but the truth of the converse is not asserted because it is 
obvious. 
Another good example of this phenomenon is a street corner sign 
like 
(11) Walk will not come on unless button is pushed. 
(example from Wirth 1975). It is pretty certain that the converse of 
(11) vill turn out to be true in this situation; that is, if the button 
is pushed, the ..,al.k light ..,ill come on. This follows from our kno..,-
ledge of buttons that are connected by electrical. Yires to stop lights. 
It does not indicate a logical ambiguity in (11) (Wirth claims that 
such an ambiguity exists). What is interesting about this example is 
that the sign writer bas bothered to state only the ha.I£ of a true 
biconditional ..,hich is not obvious to a pedestrian. That is, he wants 
only to call attention to the existence of the button as a necessary 
condition for the walk light to work. He knows that the pedestrian· 
will be able to figure out the rest for himself, and that in general 
people would rather draw their own conclusions than be given simple-
minded instructions. 
Pragmatic factors govE;?rning the use of conditional assertions, 
then, determine that in many cases the expression of a simple conditional 
is more appropriate than a biconditional, even though a biconditional 
woUld be equally true. This leads to a general expectation that 
conditional sentences will be used in this way, especially ..,hen these 
sentences are encountered in isolation and the content provides no 
obvious clue to the contrary. 
When a conditional clause qualifies a speech act such as a promise 
or request, the inference that the converse is also true will depend 
upon a different chain of conversational reasoning. Consider again 
sentence (1), and its converse, (la): 
(1) If you mow the law, I'll give you five dollars. 
(la) 	 If you don't mow the lawn, I won't give you five 
dollars. 
Whether or not someone infers (la) on the strength of (1) depends 
upon his assessment of the speaker's commitment to granting the five 
dollars, independently of the act of promising. If the speaker's 
intension hangs upon the promise, it follows .that failure of the 
condition on the promise cancels both the obligation and the intention 
to carry through on the action. It is easy enough to construct 
contexts in which the action promised is independently required by 
other factors. For example, the speaker might be five dollars in 
debt to his addressee for some other job. But it is at least a little 
unusual to offer as a reward something that you are otherwise committed 
to already. There is no reason to be motivated by (1) to mow the 
lawn, if you expect to l'eceive five dollars in any case. The simplest 
and most common use of this type of conditional promise is to offel' 
something as a reward which none of the participants expect to 
materalize independently of the promise (in the relevant future) . 
From this situational expectation, it is easy to infer: 'No action, 
no reward'. 
If a conditional promise involves a future state-of-the-world, the 
chain of reasoning that leads to a biconditional inference is somewhat 
different. In these cases, the if c1ause expresses some condition 
either on the speaker's ability to carry through on the promise, or 
the suitability of doing so under certain circwnstances. For example, 
if someone says 
(12} If I win the lottery, I'll buy you a castle. 
(12a) seems to be a reasonable inference, 
(12a) If I don't win the lottBry, I won't buy you a 
castle. 
because (12) mentions one circumstance in which the speaker foresees 
himself as enabled to make good his promise. Since the speaker has 
not mentioned any other possibility of acquiring the means to do this 
(and given that he is cooperating by being as informative as possible), 
it seems quite reasonable to infer (conversationally} that if the 
condition is not fulfilled, he won't be enabled to ful.fill his promise, 
and therefore will not. 
Similarly, if a person making a promise mentions some condition 
on the suitability of the action promised, it is hard to see the 
relevance of the condition if the speaker intends to complete the 
action in any event. Thus, in the majority of cases, a sentence like 
(13) will conversationally imply (13a): 
(13) If it rains, I'll take you to the .movies.  
(13a) If it doesn't rain, I won't take you to the movies .  
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If the prospect of going to the movies depends upon the promise, and 
only the promise, sunny weather will mean uo expedition to the movies. 
A similar argument can be constructed for conditional requests, 
but a request is complicated by the fact that there are few actions 
which people do only because they are requested to do them. But 
inferring the converse from a conditional request depends upon assessing 
the likelihood that the addressee would perform a certain action 
independently of having been requested to do so. There are cases when 
a biconditional intent behind a conditional request is quite plausible. 
For example, if someone says 
(14) 	 If this patient's temperature goes above 100, give 
him some of this medicine. 
the addressee is likely to behave as if his instructions included 
(14a) If this patient's temperature doesn't go above 100, 
don't give him some of this medicine. 
The inference seems obvious, because the content strongly indicates 
that the request involves an action that the addressee would not 
intend unless requested to do it. However, it is not true that (15a) 
is readily inferred from (15): 
(15) If I tell you to do something, do it .  
(15a) If I don't tell you to do something, don't do it.  
Unless the speaker of (15) is an utter tyrant, it seems improbable 
that his addressee will not intend some actions independently of the 
requests made by the speaker of (15). Thus, an inference that a 
conditional request implies a biconditional will depend upon the extra 
situational assumption that a person would only perform the action 
requested if it were requested of him. 
To summarize what I have said about conditional promises and 
requests: when a conditional promise (or offer, or threat) is made, 
the addressee will infer conversationally that the converse is also 
true g he believes that the action promised depends upon the act of 
promising. Although there is no general condition on making a promise 
to the effect that the promiser does not intend to perform the action 
otheryise than as a consequent of the promise, there seems to be a 
general expectation that this will be true. Expectations about how 
speech acts will be used differ from conditions on how they must be 
used, in that the expectation can be shown to be false through further 
contextual information, without voiding the speech act. Thus, English 
speakers might easily suppese that (16), by itself, suggests (16a): 
(16) If you try to escape, you will be killed. 
(16a) If you don't try to escape, you won't be killed. 
(example from Boer and Lycan 1973), However, as Boer and Lycan point 
out, if you add the information that (16) is spoken by an SS guard at 
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Auschwitz to a Jewish prisoner, hindsight cancels the inference, 
because we know that the intention to kill Jewish prisoners in this 
situation did not rest simply upon their attempts to escape. 
Conditional requests work in a similar way to promises, in 
that the if-clause contains a condition on the request itself, so 
that if the condition is not fulfilled and the intension to perform 
a certain action rests upon the fact of having been requested, the 
intention to perform the action will be cancelled. However, it is 
not generally the case that people request actions that others would 
only do if requested to do them, so that it is relatively easy to 
construct cases of conditional requests which would not conversation-
ally imply their converse, except under extreme circumstances. 
In assessing the 'meaning' of a sentence and what it is likely to 
imply conversationally, only philosophers and linguists are interested 
in the more exotic possibilities that ma:rk the outside limitations of 
form. Ordinary speakers, however, judge sentences relative to their 
expectations of normal usage. libat I have tried to show is that these 
expectations of 'normality' lead in a systematic way to the quasi-
consistent associations between form and meaning which Geis and Zvicky 
observed concerning conditional sentences in English. 
Footnotes 
lFillenbaum (ms . 1973) presents some figures to show that more 
than 90 percent of respondants on a questionnaire will agree that 
given a sentence of the form 'If p, then q', a sentence of the form, 
'If not p, not q' provides a 'reasonable inference'. I agree with 
Fillenbaum that his data provide 'some justification for the claim 
that the former sorts of inference are "invited", and some reason to 
investigate what makes them so inviting' (Pillenbaum 1973, 2) . 
Wirth (1975} claims that all English conditionals a.re logically 
ambiguous between a simple and a biconditional interpretation . How-
ever, she does not provide any clear ,case of a simple conditional 
structure vith a biconditional 'meaning', whose biconditionality 
cannot be inferred by a chain of conversational inferences such as 
those described here. One of Wirtb's examples is discussed below. 
2Note that it is possible to say-, 1I.f you would please mow the  
lawn, I 'll give you $5'.  
3rf this cactus referred to a specific plant rather than a  
species, it would be possible for (7) to conversationally imply (8).  
The implication would depend upon prior assumptions that the plant  
fulfills all the conditions necessary and sufficient for identifying  
it as an Astrophytum, except that it grows native to Idaho and  
Astrophytums are known not to do so.  
4By this I mean that he is observing Grice's {1974) conversational 
maxims. 
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